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Policy Research Working Paper 5190
Paying for performance (P4P) provides financial 
incentives for providers to increase the use and quality of 
care. P4P can affect health care by providing incentives 
for providers to put more effort into specific activities, 
and by increasing the amount of resources available to 
finance the delivery of services. This paper evaluates 
the impact of P4P on the use and quality of prenatal, 
institutional delivery, and child preventive care using 
data produced from a prospective quasi-experimental 
evaluation nested into the national rollout of P4P in 
Rwanda. Treatment facilities were enrolled in the P4P 
scheme in 2006 and comparison facilities were enrolled 
two years later. The incentive effect is isolated from 
the resource effect by increasing comparison facilities’ 
input-based budgets by the average P4P payments to 
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the treatment facilities. The data were collected from 
166 facilities and a random sample of 2158 households. 
P4P had a large and significant positive impact on 
institutional deliveries and preventive care visits by young 
children, and improved quality of prenatal care. The 
authors find no effect on the number of prenatal care 
visits or on immunization rates. P4P had the greatest 
effect on those services that had the highest payment 
rates and needed the lowest provider effort. P4P financial 
performance incentives can improve both the use of 
and the quality of health services. Because the analysis 
isolates the incentive effect from the resource effect in 
P4P, the results indicate that an equal amount of financial 
resources without the incentives would not have achieved 
the same gain in outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the fact that official development assistance for health has increased dramatically 
over the last few years, there has been limited improvement in health outcomes in low and 
middle income countries.1, 2, 3 One reason is that health worker productivity and morale is low, 
often plagued by absenteeism.4 One promising intervention to improve worker productivity is 
pay for performance (P4P),5-9 which provides incentives in the form of bonuses to providers for 
improvements in utilization and quality of care indicators. P4P can affect health care in two 
ways; first by incentivizing providers to put more effort into specific activities, and second by 
increasing the amount of resources available to finance the delivery of services. Despite the 
promise of P4P, there is little rigorous evidence on its impact in middle and low-income 
countries, and none that separates out the effect of incentives from increased resources.10 
This study examines the impact of P4P on maternal and child health services in Rwanda, 
one of the poorest countries in the world.11  Rwanda has made remarkable progress in improving 
health since the 1994 genocide.12 This study uses data produced from a prospective quasi-
experimental evaluation design nested into the P4P program rollout. Not only is this among the 
first rigorous evaluations of P4P in a low-income setting, it is the first to isolate the impact of 
P4P incentives from the associated increase in resources.  
 
METHODS  
 
In 2005, based on positive field reports from pilot NGO P4P schemes, the Government of 
Rwanda (GoR) decided to implement a national P4P scheme to supplement primary health care 
centers’ input-based budgets with bonus payments based on the quantity and quality of key 
services.13 The scheme pays for 14 maternal and child healthcare output indicators (Box 1). 
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Some of these indicators are reasons for the visit, such as prenatal care or delivery, while others 
are services provided during the visit, such as giving the tetanus vaccine during prenatal care. 
The Ministry of Health (MoH) defined these indicators and payments based on health priorities, 
available budget and the previous NGO experience.13, 14  
Facilities report their monthly indicators to the district P4P steering committee 
responsible for authorizing payment. For the referral indicators, the facility must also submit 
verification from the hospital that the referral was appropriate and the referred patient was 
treated. The committee verifies the reports by sending auditors to the facilities on a quarterly 
basis on an unannounced randomly chosen day. The auditors review the utilization registry and 
facility records to verify the data reported is the same as the data recorded in facility records. A 
comparison of facility records with face-to-face interviews of a random sample of patients 
reported very little false reporting.16 
The facility’s overall quality enters the payment formula as a multiplicative factor that 
raises or lowers the payment for all outputs. The quality index is bounded between zero and one. 
If the facility meets all of the quality criteria, then the index equals one and the facility receives 
full payment for the Box 1 services. However, if the facility is deficient in some of the quality 
criteria, then all of the payments are discounted. For example, if the facility only scores 0.80 on 
the quality index, then it only receives 80 percent of the payment for the P4P services.  
The facility’s overall quality is measured as an index of both structural and process 
measures of quality of care for various types of services (Box 2).15 Structural measures are the 
extent to which the facility has the equipment, drugs, supplies and personnel necessary to deliver 
a specific service, while process measures capture the clinical content of care provided for 
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specific services. The structural and process indicators are based on the Rwandan clinical 
practice guidelines.13, 14  
The quality indicators in Box 2 are assessed through the regular monitoring system, in 
which district hospitals monitor and supervise the quality of health centers in their districts. 
Every quarter, supervisors from the district hospital visit each facility on an unannounced 
randomly chosen day, and assess quality indicators through direct observation and review of 
patient records. At the end of the visit, they discuss their findings with the facility’s personnel, 
and provide recommendations to improve quality of services. In P4P districts, information from 
the visit is used to compute each facility’s overall quality score.  
P4P payments go directly to facilities and are used at each facility’s discretion. In the 
sample of 80 treatment facilities in the study, the P4P payments increased average overall 
expenditures by 22 percent. On average, facilities allocated 77 percent of the P4P funds to 
increase personnel compensation, amounting to a 38 percent increase in staff salaries.  
Experimental Design  
The evaluation design took advantage of the phased implementation of the program at the 
district level over a 24-month period. Administrative districts with pre-existing NGO P4P 
schemes were excluded from the sampling frame. The remaining districts were then grouped into 
8 pairs based on similar characteristics for rainfall, population density, and predominant 
livelihoods using data from the 2002 Census. One side of each pair was then randomly assigned 
into the treatment group and the other into the comparison group.  
Just before implementation of the baseline survey, the administrative district boundaries 
were redrawn in the context of a decentralization effort.17  As a result, some of the experimental 
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areas were combined with areas that already had the NGO P4P schemes. Because P4P could not 
be “removed” from health facilities that were already implementing the system, the GoR 
required that all facilities within those new districts be reassigned to treatment. This led the 
evaluation team to switch the assignment of treatment and comparison for two of the eight pairs. 
As a result, 166 of Rwanda’s 401 primary care facilities were included in the study.  
The facilities in the treatment group started receiving P4P in 2006, while the facilities in 
the comparison group continued with input-based financing for an additional 24 months. P4P 
was implemented in treatment districts over a 5-month period, yielding a minimum 18-month 
exposure period. Since a primary objective of the evaluation was to isolate the P4P incentive 
effect separately from the effect of an increase in financial resources, it was necessary to hold the 
level of resources constant across treatment and comparison facilities. To accomplish this, 
comparison facilities’ input-based budgets were increased by the average amount of P4P 
payments to treatment facilities on a quarterly basis during the 24-month treatment window.  
We conducted a baseline survey and a follow-up survey 24 months later of the 166 
facilities, as well as a random sample of 13 households living in each facility’s catchment area. 
For the household sample, we first sampled 13 zones (each with approximately 15-20 
households) from each facility’s official list of zones in their catchment area. We then physically 
listed all households in the sampled zones and randomly selected one household with at least one 
child under 6 years old from each zone. This sample size is large enough to estimate program 
effects of at least 30% in the number of prenatal care visits and the probability of an institutional 
delivery with 90% power and a significance level of 0.05 based on data and intra-cluster 
correlations from the 2005 Rwandan DHS data in rural areas.  
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Two percent of sampled households refused to participate in the interview. In the follow-
up survey, 88 percent of the baseline households were re-interviewed. The rate of attrition from 
the baseline sample was not statistically different between the treatment and comparison groups 
(12 percent each). Households that could not be found or interviewed were replaced with 
randomly selected households from the same zones.  
Outcome Measures  
Maternal health services: The outcomes include one indicator variable for any prenatal care 
utilization, one for completing 4+ prenatal care visits, and one for institutional delivery. 
Quality of prenatal care: We assess the quality of prenatal care delivered by computing the 
share of clinical content items that should compose a typical first prenatal consultation, as 
recommended in the Rwandan clinical practice guidelines for prenatal care, to the actual clinical 
content items delivered during a prenatal care consultation.18 This measure has been used 
extensively in the literature to measure quality.19-25 The items in the measure cover medical 
history questions, physical examinations, lab tests and follow-up procedures (Box 3). The 
Cronbach alpha scale of reliability for the 38 item score is 0.78, indicating satisfactory internal 
consistency. In the impact analysis, we standardize the score by subtracting out the baseline 
mean and dividing by the baseline standard deviation. The unit of measurement is interpreted as 
standard deviations in quality.  
The prenatal quality score was computed at the individual patient level using two 
samples. First, enumerators interviewed women who visited the facility as they exited the 
facility. Second, the same information was collected in the household survey from women who 
gave birth in the last 18 months and received prenatal care from the facility in whose catchment 
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area they lived. In the analysis, we combined the exit interview and household survey data for 
first prenatal care visits to assess the impact of P4P on prenatal care quality, and we control for 
the observation’s source in the analysis with an indicator variable for whether the observation 
was from the exit interview or household survey.  
In addition to the prenatal care process quality index, we measure whether women 
reported receiving the tetanus vaccine during prenatal care visits, as this enters the payment 
formula as one of the 14 P4P output indicators and as one of the process quality of care measures 
in the quality of care index. 
Child Preventive Care: We define preventive care as whether the mother reported taking her 
child for a preventive care visit in the last four weeks. Child preventive services cover 
immunization, vitamin A, distribution of mosquito nets and child growth monitoring with 
referral of malnourished children to hospitals for treatment. We analyze preventive visits 
separately for children 0-23 and 24-59 months old as the younger group is expected to have more 
visits than the older group.  
We also examine the impact of P4P on full immunization, measured by an indicator 
variable for 12-23 month olds, coded 1 if the child received all vaccines required by the national 
protocol and 0 otherwise. Vaccination status was assessed based on the vaccination card. Less 
than 4 percent of the mothers could not produce the child’s vaccination card and they were 
dropped from the analysis. 
Statistical Methods 
As a result of the reassignment of some districts, we view the evaluation design as quasi-
experimental and use difference-in-differences to estimate program impact. This method 
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compares the change in outcomes in the treatment group to the change in outcomes in the 
comparison group. By comparing changes, we control for observed and unobserved time-
invariant characteristics as well as for time-varying factors that are common to the treatment and 
comparison groups. The change in the comparison group is an estimate of the true counterfactual 
– i.e. what would have happened to the treatment group if there had been no intervention.  
We estimate a multivariate regression specification of the difference-in-difference model 
where an individual’s outcome is regressed against a dummy variable indicating whether the 
facility was receiving P4P that year, an individual fixed effect, a year indicator, and a series of 
individual and household characteristics. We compute robust standard errors clustered at the 
district by year level to correct for correlation of the error terms across facilities within districts. 
The models were estimated using Stata version 10. 
Covariates 
In all of the estimated models, we control for the number of family members, the number 
of family members under six years old, family assets, the distance of the household from the 
facility, and whether the family is enrolled in health insurance. Assets are measured as the value 
of owned houses, durables in the house, farm animals, farm equipment and microenterprise 
equipment. We also include a variable for if the household owned land. In the prenatal care and 
delivery analyses, we also control for maternal years of schooling, marital status, whether the 
partner currently lives in the household, the number of prior pregnancies, and age defined in 
years. In the prenatal care quality analysis, we also include a variable indicating whether the 
observation was from the facility exit interview or household survey. In the children’s utilization 
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and outcomes analyses, we include controls for whether the mother and father currently live in 
the household, their age and years of schooling, the child’s age and sex. 
Ethical Review 
This study was designed and implemented while Gertler was at the World Bank. 
Although the World Bank does not have an Institutional Review Board, the study team submitted 
the research protocol to the Rwanda National Ethics Committee, which approved the research 
design, methodology and methods for informed consent.  
RESULTS  
We confirm that the evaluation design achieved balance at baseline of observed facility 
characteristics between the treatment and comparison groups. Table 1 reports the baseline means 
of facility characteristics in 2006. We find no significant differences between the treatment and 
comparison groups in terms of log expenditures, allocation of the budget across medical personnel, 
medical supplies and non-medical purposes, and the numbers of physicians, nurses and other types 
of personnel.  
In the second row of Table 1, we report the mean 2008 log expenditures for treatment and 
comparison facilities and find no statistically significant difference in the means after the 
introduction of P4P in the treatment facilities. This confirms that the program compensated the 
comparison facilities with an increase in their traditional budget equal to the increase in treatment 
facilities’ resources and validates the interpretation of any estimated impacts being caused by in 
the introduction of P4P incentives, as opposed to an increase in resources. 
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Maternal Health Services 
Our sample consists of women who gave birth in the 18 months prior to the survey: 620 
treatments and 670 comparisons. We find no statistical differences in baseline means of the control 
and outcome variables used in the regression models, except for the share of women who 
completed 4 prenatal care visits (Table 2a). Although 95 percent of women in the sample obtained 
some prenatal care, only about 10 percent of women initiated prenatal care in their first trimester 
and the mean number of visits was less than 3. While about 18 percent of women in treatment 
areas completed 4 visits, only 11 percent in comparison areas did so. Less than 35 percent of 
women delivered in a health facility. Finally, while close to 70 percent of women received a 
tetanus shot, providers executed only 46 percent of the clinical activities recommended in the 
Rwandan clinical practice guidelines for prenatal care. 
Table 3 reports the estimated P4P program impacts on maternal outcomes. First, as 
indicated by the coefficient on the wave dummy, there were statistically significant increases from 
2006 to 2008 in the entire sample for prenatal care, institutional deliveries and quality of prenatal 
care. There appears to be no impact of P4P on the probability of any prenatal care or on the 
probability of completing 4+ visits. However, we estimate a statistically significant impact on the 
probability of institutional delivery of 0.074, with a 95 percent confidence region of (0.004, 0.143), 
which represents a 21 percent increase from baseline. We also find significant impacts on the 
quality of prenatal care. We estimate that the impact on the probability of receiving a tetanus 
vaccine is 0.054 (0.007, 0.265), which is a 7.6 percent increase from the baseline. We also estimate 
an increase of 0.14 (0.015, 0.265) standard deviations in the standardized prenatal quality score. 
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Child Health Services 
The sample includes children 0-59 months at the time of the survey, and is well balanced 
between the treatment and comparison groups in terms of baseline control and outcome used in the 
regression analysis (Table 3). On average across the sample, children 0-23 months old had 0.22 
preventive visits in the 4 weeks prior to the survey. Children 24-59 months old living in treatment 
areas visited the health center 0.08 times in the last 4 weeks on average, while for those living in 
comparison areas visited 0.14 times, though the difference is not statistically significant at the 5 
percent level.  
We find large significant impacts of P4P on children’s use of preventive health care (Table 
4). We estimate that P4P increased the probability that a child 0-23 months visited a health center 
for preventive care by 0.134 (0.045, 0.224), which is a 64 percent increase over baseline. 
Similarly, we estimate that P4P increased the probability that a child 24-59 months had a 
preventive visit by 0.106 (0.050, 0.111), which is a whopping 133 percent increase from the 
baseline probability for the treatment group. However, we did not find a significant effect on the 
probability that a child 12-23 months old was fully immunized. 
DISCUSSION  
We provide evidence that the incentives in the Rwandan P4P program are significantly 
associated with increased use and quality of a number of critical maternal and child health care 
services, but not associated with others. These differences are probably related to the structure of 
the incentives. In general, we see a larger impact on services with higher incentives and for 
services that are more in the control of the provider and depend less on patients’ decisions. For 
example, prenatal care quality and tetanus vaccination are completely in the provider’s control 
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whereas prenatal care visits depend on the mother deciding to come to the facility. At most, the 
provider can lobby the mother, but in the end the decision is hers. 
Deliveries have the highest unit payment rate at $4.59. Providers reported they found 
deliveries to be so lucrative they not only encouraged women to deliver in the facility during 
prenatal care, but some also commissioned community health workers to conduct outreach in the 
community to find pregnant women to deliver in the facility.  
Similarly, the large increase in preventive child visits is also explained by the higher 
payment rate. While the payment rate per child preventive visit is low at $0.18, the rate for 
finding a malnourished child and referring her for treatment is very high at $1.83. Given that 
almost 50 percent of children in Rwanda are stunted and could be referred,12 approximately half 
of the child preventive growth monitoring visits yielded $0.18 each, while the other half yielded 
$2.01 each for the growth visit plus the identification and referral of a malnourished child. 
One of the strongest monetary payoffs is for prenatal care quality. Specifically, every 
administration of tetanus vaccine and malaria prophylaxis yields $0.92, as well as increases the 
prenatal care quality index score. In addition, providers can use prenatal care visits to lobby 
women to deliver in the facility, a service for which they receive an additional $4.59. Finally, 
improved compliance with prenatal care clinical practice guidelines CPGs raises the facility’s 
overall quality score and thereby the share of the P4P payments actually received.  
The lack of impact on prenatal care utilization is also explained by poor financial 
incentives. The payment rate for the initial prenatal visit is very low at $0.09. Since over 95 
percent of women at baseline made at least one visit, the $0.09 payment provides little incentive 
to find the few remaining women who do not use prenatal care. Second, the payment rate for 
completing 4 visits is only $0.37. Since women start prenatal care late in Rwanda (5th or 6th 
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month) and have between 2 to 3 visits on average, it is difficult to complete additional visits in 
such a short period of time. Providers may not have wanted to expend the enormous effort 
necessary to get these women to come back for 1 to 2 more visits for only $0.37. 
The fact that we did not find an impact of P4P on child vaccinations might be explained 
in part by the fact that baseline immunization rates were close to 65% and the government 
implemented an intensive national vaccination campaign starting in 2006.26 An increase beyond 
this would have required substantial effort on the part of the providers to enter the community, 
identify unvaccinated children and provide them with vaccinations. Moreover, completing the 
immunization program for a child requires a lot of effort as it involves many clinic visits over the 
course of the year and more complex record keeping. 
One possible alternative explanation for our findings is increased monitoring and 
supervision led to increased provider effort. However, there are a number of reasons to believe 
that the financial incentives are driving the results. First, monitoring and supervision by the 
district hospitals is required nationally, independent of the P4P scheme. Second, if the primary 
pathway was through increased monitoring and supervision, one would expect to see an increase 
in provider knowledge in the treatment facilities as a result of the feedback during the 
supervision visits. We find no statistical difference between treatment and comparison groups on 
provider knowledge on prenatal care. Third, we only see improvement in some indicators and not 
in others. If the monitoring were effective, then we would see increases in both low priced 
services and high priced services. 
 
 14 
Policy Implications 
Our findings illuminate the debate on some of the benefits and shortfalls of P4P. A 
number of specific P4P lessons also emerge from this study.  
1. Higher payments provide high-powered incentives.  
2. Incentives have a larger impact for services in which providers have more control, 
such as prenatal care quality. Therefore, higher incentive payments are warranted not 
only for services that are more important in terms of leading to better health 
outcomes, but also where more provider effort is required to improve those services.  
3. Programs should consider paying more for verifiable clinical content indicators. 
Content indicators are closely related to outcomes, are measurable, and are solely 
within the control of the provider.  
4. For services that depend more on patient behavior, such as the decision to seek 
prenatal care, the program might provide financial incentives directly to the patient 
rather than the provider. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that conditional cash 
transfers to families increase preventive care utilization and improve health 
outcomes.41-49 Another feasible alternative is to give community health workers an 
incentive to identify patients and encourage them to visit clinics.  
One of the more important results of this analysis is the effect of P4P on the quality of 
care delivered. Although health workers may be competent to perform a medical procedure or 
consultation (i.e. prenatal care), they may not always be willing or motivated to expend the effort 
to perform all the required components of that procedure.27, 28  By conditioning the Rwanda P4P 
payment on a quality index score, the evidence suggests that the incentive gave providers the 
motivation to translate their knowledge about prenatal care into better practice. These results are 
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important primarily because better quality care yields better health outcomes, and in the case of 
prenatal care this impacts both pregnant women and their children.27, 29-32 Indeed it is not enough 
to get mothers and children into care, it also matters that the care they receive is of high quality. 
 
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to the study. First, the original randomized designed was 
revised due to the political decentralization process. While we can be confident in the results of the 
difference-in-differences analysis given that the sample is well balanced on observable 
characteristics and outcomes at baseline, this is one of the challenges for effectiveness studies in 
the context of the scale-up of national programs. However, while small-scale efficacy trials are 
easier to control, they only inform us about what is possible given the best-case scenario in 
program implementation. Efficiency studies, such as this rigorous evaluation of a national health 
program, are important for external validity and inform us about what is the likely impact under 
more realistic conditions. Second, we only measure quality of care for prenatal services. Hence 
further study is required to see if the incentive effects for prenatal care quality extend to other 
services.  
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Box 1: Output Indicators and Unit Payments for P4P Formula 
  
OUTPUT INDICATORS 
Amount paid per unit 
(US$) 
Visit and Outreach Indicators: Number of …   
1 curative care visits 0.18 
2 first prenatal care visits 0.09 
3 women who completed 4 prenatal care visits 0.37 
4 first time family planning visits (new contraceptive users) 1.83 
5 one-month contraceptive resupply  0.18 
6 deliveries in the facility 4.59 
7 child (0 - 59 months) growth monitoring (preventive care) visits 0.18 
8 children who completed vaccinations on time  0.92 
Content of care indicators: Number of …   
9 women who received appropriate tetanus vaccine during prenatal care+ 0.46 
10 women who received 2nd dose of malaria prophylaxis during prenatal care 0.46 
11 at risk pregnancies referred to hospital for delivery during prenatal care++ 1.83 
12 emergency transfers to hospital for obstetric care during delivery++ 4.59 
13 malnourished children referred for treatment during preventive care visit++ 1.83 
14 other emergency referrals during curative treatment++ 1.83 
+ Appropriate is defined to any woman who obtains her second, third, fourth or fifth tetanus shot.  
++ Referrals must be confirmed by hospital that patient was treated and referral was necessary. 
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Box 2: Services and Weights Used to Construct the Quality Score for P4P Formula 
 
(Web Version ONLY) 
 
Service 
Quality 
Index 
Weight 
Share of weight 
allocated to 
structural 
components 
Share of weight 
allocated to 
process 
components 
Means of assessment 
1 General administration 0.052 1.00 0.00 Direct observation 
2 Cleanliness 0.028 1.00 0.00 Direct observation 
3 Curative care 0.170 0.23 0.77 Medical record review 
4 Delivery 0.130 0.40 0.60 Medical record review 
5 Prenatal care 0.126 0.12 0.88 Direct observation 
6 Family planning 0.114 0.22 0.78 Medical record review 
7 Immunization 0.070 0.40 0.60 Direct observation 
8 Growth monitoring 0.052 0.15 0.85 Direct observation 
9 HIV services 0.090 1.00 0.00 Direct observation 
10 Tuberculosis services 0.028 0.28 0.72 Direct observation 
11 Laboratory Services 0.030 1.00 0.00 Direct observation 
12 Pharmacy management 0.060 1.00 0.00 Direct observation 
13 Financial management 0.050 1.00 0.00 Direct observation 
  Total 1.000       
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 Box 3: Items Included in Rwandan Clinical Practice Guidelines for Prenatal Care 
(Web Version ONLY) 
 
Area Items included 
Pregnancy history:  
 
Number of prior pregnancies, living children, and miscarriages, bleeding during 
previous labor, how the last child was delivered, and last child’s birth weight. 
Pregnancy history:  
 
Number of prior pregnancies, living children, and miscarriages, bleeding during 
previous labor, how the last child was delivered, and last child’s birth weight. 
Gynecological history:  STIs including HIV, pap smear, contraceptive use, last menstrual date, and related 
health problems.  
Medical history:  High blood pressure, diabetes, contraceptive use, heart disease, disease, malaria, 
goiter, and tobacco and alcohol use.  
Obstetric symptoms:  Contractions, vaginal bleeding, weight loss/gain, nausea, vomiting, and current 
medications.  
Physical examination:  Body height, body weight, check vital signs (blood pressure, temperature, 
respiratory), palpitate abdomen, listen to fetal heartbeat, check for edema and 
measure uterus. 
Laboratory tests  Hemoglobin (anemia), diabetes, urine protein, platelet count, HIV and STIs (syphilis 
/gonorrhea).  
Prevention/case 
management:  
Advice about nutrition, tetanus vaccine, iron/folic acid supplementation, advice about 
danger signs for emergency help, HIV voluntary counseling/test, and complete 
prenatal card.  
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Table 1: Health Facility Baseline (2006) Characteristics 
 
  Treatment Comparison Difference P-Value* 
  Mean Std dev Mean Std dev     
Expenditures and Budget Shares             
Log Total Expenditures (2006) 15.81 (1.04) 15.61 (1.01) 0.200 0.418 
Log Total Expenditures (2008) 16.91 (0.71) 16.99 (1.08) -0.083 0.568 
Medical Personnel Budget Share 0.46 (0.23) 0.49 (0.26) -0.031 0.555 
Medical Supplies Budget Share 0.22 (0.19) 0.20 (0.19) 0.013 0.705 
Non-medical Budget Share 0.32 (0.25) 0.30 (0.22) 0.018 0.726 
Staffing             
Medical Doctors 0.05 (0.23) 0.05 (0.27) 0.003 0.940 
Nurses 6.31 (6.90) 5.48 (3.30) 0.826 0.409 
Other Clinical Staff 4.13 (3.09) 4.47 (4.05) -0.335 0.554 
Non-clinical Staff 5.25 (3.56) 5.33 (5.09) -0.076 0.901 
Observations 80 86     
Note: All variables, except Log Expenditures 2008, are measured at baseline (2006). 
*P-values are for cluster-adjusted t-test (continuous variables). 
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Table 2: Maternal Sample Baseline (2006) Characteristics 
 
  Treatment Comparison Difference p-value* 
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev   
Maternal characteristics             
Age 30.89 (7.05) 31.22 (6.85) -0.33 0.594 
Primary education or more (=1) 0.42 (0.03) 0.35 (0.04) -0.01 0.889 
Currently married/union (=1) 0.94 (0.23) 0.91 (0.29) 0.04 0.214 
Partner present (=1) 0.98 (0.14) 0.97 (0.17) 0.01 0.325 
Number of pregnancies (Parity) 4.32 (2.46) 4.33 (2.43) -0.01 0.969 
Number of living children 3.39 (1.93) 3.51 (2.62) -0.12 0.490 
Health insurance (=1) 0.55 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.04 0.591 
Household characteristics             
Number of household members 5.15 (1.70) 5.40 (1.94) -0.25 0.145 
Own land (=1) 0.93 (0.25) 0.87 (0.33) 0.06 0.126 
Value of Assets (household, animals, farm and enterprise equipment)     
Quartile 1 (=1) 0.22 (0.42) 0.22 (0.42) 0.00 0.994 
Quartile 2 (=1) 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.00 0.885 
Quartile 3 (=1) 0.27 (0.45) 0.28 (0.45) -0.01 0.885 
Quartile 4 (=1) 0.25 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.01 0.772 
Maternal care utilization             
Any prenatal care (=1) 0.95 (0.21) 0.96 (0.20) -0.01 0.773 
Started in first trimester 0.11 (0.32) 0.09 (0.29) 0.02 0.544 
4 or more prenatal care visits (=1) 0.18 (0.38) 0.11 (0.31) 0.07 0.036 
Number of prenatal care visits 2.76 (0.84) 2.62 (0.80) 0.14 0.180 
Delivery in facility (=1) 0.35 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) -0.01 0.801 
Quality of prenatal care             
Total Quality Score 0.46 (0.02) 0.47 (0.02) -0.01 0.6661 
Standardized Total Quality Score -0.13 (0.06) -0.10 (0.06) -0.03 0.7348 
Tetanus vaccine (=1) 0.71 (0.45) 0.67 (0.47) 0.04 0.309 
* P-values are for cluster-adjusted t-test or chi-squared tests of difference. 
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 Table 3: Children 0-5 years old Baseline (2006) Characteristics 
 
  Treatment Comparison Difference P-Value* 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev   
Child characteristics             
Age (in months) 30.45 (0.58) 29.95 (0.58) 0.50 0.51 
Female (=1) 0.50 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.01 0.59 
Parental characteristics             
Mother present (=1) 0.97 (0.01) 0.96 (0.01) 0.01 0.13 
Mother's age 31.62 (0.33) 32.08 (0.32) -0.45 0.38 
Mother's years of education 5.57 (0.19) 5.61 (0.20) -0.03 0.99 
Father present (=1) 0.87 (0.02) 0.90 (0.02) -0.03 0.30 
Father's age 36.10 (0.39) 36.58 (0.40) -0.48 0.33 
Father's years of education 6.06 (0.31) 6.27 (0.34) -0.20 0.65 
Household characteristics             
Number of household members 5.06 (0.09) 5.21 (0.09) -0.15 0.26 
Number of members 0-5 years old 2.18 (0.03) 2.21 (0.03) -0.03 0.44 
Own land (=1) 0.87 (0.02) 0.92 (0.02) -0.05 0.15 
Value of Assets (household, animals, farm and enterprise equipment) 
Quartile 1 (=1) 0.22 (0.03) 0.23 (0.02) -0.01 0.77 
Quartile 2 (=1) 0.28 (0.03) 0.25 (0.02) 0.03 0.27 
Quartile 3 (=1) 0.26 (0.04) 0.28 (0.03) -0.02  0.71 
Quartile 4 (=1) 0.23 (0.02)  0.24 (0.02) -0.01 0.71 
Child preventive medical care             
Visit by child 0-23 months in last 4 weeks (=1) 0.21 (0.02) 0.24 (0.03) -0.03 0.56 
Visit by child 24-59 months in last 4 weeks (=1) 0.08 (0.02) 0.14 (0.02) -0.05 0.11 
12-23 month old is fully immunized (=1) 0.62 (0.06) 0.67 (0.06) -0.05 0.52 
* P-values are for cluster-adjusted t-test or chi-squared tests of difference. 
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Table 4: Estimated Impact of P4P on Maternal and Child Health Care Services 
 
 N β (95% C.I.) P-Value % ∆+ 
Maternal Care Utilization*      
    Any prenatal care (=1) 2223 0.002 (-0.022 - 0.025) 0.894 0.2% 
    Made 4 or more prenatal care visits 2223  0.010 (-0.063 - 0.083) 0.790 5.6% 
    Institutional delivery (=1) 2108 0.074 (0.006 - 0.142) 0.033 21.1% 
Quality of Prenatal Care**      
   Standardized Quality Score 3683 0.14 (0.015 - 0.265) 0.030 NA 
   Tetanus vaccine during prenatal visit (=1) 2810  0.054 (0.007 - 0.100) 0.024 7.6% 
Child Preventive Visit in last 4 weeks***      
   Visit by child age 0-23 months (=1) 1973 0.134 (0.045 - 0.224) 0.004 63.8% 
   Visit by child age 24-59 months (=1) 3645 0.106 (0.050 - 0.161) 0.000 132.5% 
   Child 12-23 months is fully immunized (=1) 732 -0.065 (-0.178 - 0.047) 0.248 -10.5% 
* The β is the estimated treatment effect controlling for a year dummy, facility fixed effects, individual-level 
characteristics (age, education, number of children, civil status, presence of partner, health insurance) and 
household characteristics (number of household members, value of assets, land ownership and distance from the 
facility). Standard errors were adjusted for clustering at the health facility-year level. 
** The β is the estimated treatment effect controlling for provider-level characteristics (age, gender, competency 
score), patient-level characteristics (age, education, civil status, insurance enrollment). Standard errors were 
adjusted for clustering at the health facility-year level. The number of observations in the tetanus model is less 
than in the quality score model because tetanus is only given to women with 5 pregnancies or less. 
*** The β is the estimated treatment effect controlling for individual-level characteristics (age, gender, insurance 
enrollment), parental-level characteristics (mother/father present, age, education) and household characteristics 
(number of household members, value of assets, land ownership and distance from the facility). Standard errors 
were adjusted for clustering at the health facility level. 
+ The % ∆ = (β / Baseline Mean)∗100, where the baseline mean of the dependent variable is the 2006 mean of the 
treatment group form Tables 2 and 3. 
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